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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLOID C. HARTMAN and 
RUTH A. HARTMAN, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
-vs-
ORA ANN POTTER, HUSKY 
OIL COMPANY and CHEVRON 
OIL COMPANY, 
Defendants - Respondents. 
Case No. 16004 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ORA ANN POTTER 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to a partial interest in 
oil, gas and other mineral rights subject to a reservation of 
those rights in a deed conveying the surface. 
In the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County the 
case was decided on cross motions for summary judgment by the 
Honorable David K. Winder, Judge, who quieted title to the disputed 
mineral interest in Mrs. Ora Ann Potter, Defendant below, herein 
referred to as Respondent. 
On this appeal Respondent seeks to have the decision below 
affirmed with costs awarded to Respondent. 
FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with or adopt Appellant's "statement 
of facts" because Appellants have mixed fact, theory and argument 
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therein, although to the extent basic facts are asserted 
Respondent raises no issue thereon. Respondent's Statement of 
Facts follows: 
In July, 1946, William M. Potter conveyed to one C. R. Bennett 
one-half of the mineral estate of the 160 acre parcel of land 
which is the subject of this action. Then, in 1951, the same 
William M. Potter conveyed the surface of the same parcel by a 
deed containing the following reservation: 
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4) 
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land 
belonging, with the right of ingress and egress thereon for 
the purpose of finding and producing oil, gas, and minerals 
thereon." 
The deed was prepared by employees of a bank which acted as 
escrow agent for the transaction. The bank apparently acted under 
the direction of, and on behalf of, both parties. (Floid C. Hartman 
Deposition, pp. 11 and 12.) Hartman was present when the deed was 
prepared and signed in 1951. (Hartman deposition p. 12, line 10). 
William M. Potter died and the subject land descended to 
Ora Ann Potter, Respondent here. 
Much later, from approximately 1967 to 1970 both Hartman and 
Respondent leased mineral interests to various oil companies. Oil 
was subsequently discovered nearby and a part of the proceeds of 
the production of that oil was due the owners of the minerals of 
the subject parcel of land. The portion allocable to one-half of 
the mineral estate has been paid to Respondent Ora Ann Potter; 
Appellant Hartman has received no royalties at all. 
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In 1976 Hartman brought the action on appeal here on the 
theory that he owns a part of the mineral estate of the parcel 
as well as the surface. Both parties agreed that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and filed cross motions for 
summary judgment in the court below. 1 
ISSUE 
The single issue in this case is whether the three-fourths 
mineral reservation in the deed from Respondent's predecessor in 
interest successfully reserved the one-half interest which he had 
at the time, or whether it somehow acted to reserve less than that 
one-half interest. 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT MET THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY FAVORING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION. 
Appellants assign the error of the trial court as being one 
of "fact" on page 6 of their brief where they complain, "Had the lower 
court considered the conduct of the parties in arriving at its 
1Appellant Hartman did 
in the form of testimony of 
deceased William M. Potter. 
trial court with Appellant's 
hearing transcript shows: 
offer evidence in the trial court 
Hartman on conversations with the 
That testimony was barred by the 
acquiescence. Page 9 of the 
"The Court: Well as far as any of the evidence of the 
plaintiffs' getting in, Mr. Hisatake, that isn't going to 
occur under the Deadman's Statute. Don't you acknowledge that? 
Mr. Hisatake: Yes." 
-3-
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conclusion as to the intent of the parties . An error of 
fact in a suit in equity will lead to reversal only when the weight 
of the evidence is clearly against the facts as found by the trial 
court. Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 U.2d 251, 265 P.2d 420 (1954). 
Appellants assign as errors in the court below that (1) the de~ 
should have been construed against the grantor, and (2) that it 
should be construed in favor of its fullest effect and against 
ambiguity. Far from overcoming the presumption that the trial 
court ruled correctly, the first of these arguments of law is clearly 
inapplicable under the law of Utah, as stated in Russell v. Geyser 
Marion Gold Mining Company, 18 U.2d 363, 423 P.2d 487 (1967) and 
Reese Howell v. Brown, et al., 48 Utah 141, 158 Pac. 684 (1916), 
while the second proposition of law actually favors Respondent. 
Both of these positions are more fully argued below. 
This court defined the standard for overcoming the presumption 
of validity of a trial court's decision in Searle v. Searle, 522 
P2d 697 (Utah, 1974): 
"The actions of the trial court are indulged with a 
presumption of validity, and the burden is upon appellant 
to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." (footnote omitted) 
Appellants have simply failed to meet this burden with the 
three conclusions reached in their brief, which are either inapplic~ 
or contrary to their position. 
The Decision in the District Court was rendered in Summary 
Judgment. Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, such 
judgment may be had where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. 
-4-
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In this case cross motions for summary judgment were filed, 
supported by memoranda of each party relating consistent fact 
descriptions. No issue has been raised as to factual dispute, and 
the matter does not invite factual controversy. Thus the Summary 
Judgment was properly rendered and the presumption of its correct-
ness properly supported. 
POINT II 
CONTRARY TO APPELLANTS' POSITION, THEIR ACT OF LEASING THE DISPUTED 
INTEREST IN THE MINERAL ESTATE DOES NOT STRENGTHEN THEIR CLAIM TO 
THAT INTEREST. 
Appellants argue on page 6 of their brief that their entry 
into leasing arrangements "with various companies believing that 
they owned a one-fourth (l/4) interest to the oil, gas and mineral 
rights" evinces actual ownership of the minerals. The thrust of 
this argument is that a rule of construction that a conveyance 
should be construed to have the effect given it by the parties to 
it -- should be applied. This is a valid rule of construction, but 
Appellants would apply it only to a portion of the facts in this 
case. It is undisputed that Respondent also leased her one-half 
of the mineral rights that she believed (correctly, as the trial 
court found) that she owned. It is in fact Respondent's lease and 
the royalties paid Respondent thereunder that are the real subject 
matter of this law suit. In sum, these actions by the parties 
to the deed cancel each other out. 
But there is more to this rule of construction (which actually 
favors Respondent's position) than the actions of the parties to 
-5-
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the deed, acting alone. Husky Oil Company and Chevron Oil Company 
have become involved in this lawsuit as co-defendants because of the 
effect they have given to the deed in question. It is not only 
undisputed, but was the substance of Appellants' complaint, that 
these companies, aged and experienced giants of the petroleum industry, 
and well advised by their own legal staffs, have agreed with Respo~~ 
Potter in a most convincing way: by paying to her the full royalties 
attributable to her one-half mineral interest. The overwhelming 
weight of the treatment given the conveyance, by the greatest number 
and most knowledgable of those affected by it, favor Respondent 
Potter's ownership of one-half of the mineral estate. 
Appellants misinterpret the cases cited in support of their 
position. In Wood, et al., v. Ashby, et al., 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 
351, (1952), cited by Appellants, the court looked to the acts of 
the parties in giving practical effect to a deed. Plaintiffs in 
that case prevailed but it was Defendants' acts in giving practical 
effect to the deed, contrary to Defendants' own interest, that 
supported Plaintiffs' position. In so noting the court said: 
"The record reveals that defendants acted in such use of 
the strip with the permission of plaintiffs, and when 
interference with plaintiffs' rights resulted from such 
activities defendants upon demand were quick to rectify 
the situation." 
253 P.2d at 354. Thus it was defendants' actions which gave effect 
to plaintiffs' rights. 
In Garcia v. Garcia, 86 N.M. 503, 525 P.2d 863 (1974), also 
cited by Appellant, acts of both parties combined to give the 
effect found by the court. 525 P.2d at 865. 
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In White v. Brooks, 266 OR 506, 512 P.2d 1350 (1973), likewise 
cited by Appellant, it was the combined and cooperative efforts of 
all parties in constructing a driveway that gave effect to the 
contested deed. 2 All of these cases are distinguished from the 
instant case by the absence of any act or omission on the part of 
Respondent Potter that is in any way consistent with the ownership 
by her of less than one-half of the entire mineral estate. 
Appellants' position is simply not supported by either the facts 
or the authorities cited. The decision of the trial court was 
grounded upon the "intent of the parties", as manifested by their 
acts and the language of the deed. The same arguments, based in 
part on Hartman's self serving "consistent actions", were considered 
and rejected by Judge Winder, who ruled that Respondent Potter was 
the legal owner of the entire one-half interest in the minerals. 
This Court has said that, when a trial court has looked to surrounding 
circumstances in construing a deed, "[The Utah Supreme Court) will 
not disturb [the trial court's) findings nor the judgment based 
thereon unless the weight of the evidence is clearly against them." 
Clotworthy v. Clyde, supra, 265 P.2d at 421. In the instant case the 
evidence clearly favors the trial court's decision and it should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE RULE THAT A DEED SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE GRANTEE 
AND AGAINST THE GRANTOR IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
2Plaintiff's other case, Clotworthy v. Clyde, supra, merely 
states that a court may look to surrounding circumstances in 
construing a deed, a point with which Respondent wholeheartedly agrees. 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The paramount rule of construction of deeds is that the intent 
of the parties governs. The rule merely favoring grantee, because 
he is the grantee, is a refuge of the last resort for a court with 
no other grounds on which to make a decision. In Russell v. 
Geyser - Marion Gold Mining Company, supra, a reservation of 
grazing rights was contested. Ruling in favor of the grantor of 
the contested deed, the Court said: 
"This rule of construction favoring grantees is one 
of the last rules of construction that should be applied 
and need not be resorted to so long as a satisfactory 
result can be reached by other more reliable rules. [23 
Am. Jur. 2d §165.) Clearly such a rule of construction 
should be subordinate and yield to the paramount rule 
that the intent of the parties is to be given effect if 
it can be ascertained and if it does not contravene the 
clear meaning of the words in the grant." 
423 P. 2d at 490. That holding was no novelty, having been adopted 
by this Court in 1916, in response to the same argument being made 
by Plaintiff here: 
"We have, however, held, and are firmly committed 
to the doctrine, that we will have recourse to every 
aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascertain the 
intention of the parties before having recourse to the 
rule of construing the language of the parties either 
most strongly against or in favor of either of them." 
(Citations omitted) 
Reese Howell Company v. Brown, et al., 48 Utah at 149, 158 Pac. 
at 687. 
In the instant case there are ample, inviting and preferable 
alternatives to the arbitrary rule which simply says that the granW 
of a conveyance should be favored. The intent of the grantor to 
reserve his minerals (indeed, to reserve more than he even had) and 
-8-
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the actions of all parties taken together as argued above, make 
application of the arbitrary rule avoidable, as an undesirable last 
resort. This Court, in the cases cited above, has stated that it 
will avoid this arbitrary rule whenever possible. 
POINT IV 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEED IN FAVOR OF VALIDITY AND AGAINST AMBIGUITY 
FAVORS RESPONDENT POTTER. 
Appellants argue that the expressed intent of the 1951 deed, to 
reserve a three-fourths mineral interest where only a one-half 
mineral interest remained in the grantor, created an ambiguity. The 
document itself is not ambiguous at all; only the circumstances raise 
a question. Respondent submits that there is no issue of "ambiguity", 
only of practical effect of the expressed intent of the document under 
these circumstances. 
Appellant argues that the deed, which purports to reserve more 
than the grantor had, should be construed to reserve less than he 
had, in order to give the "most logical" interpretation to the 
instrument. The converse, however, was more convincing to the 
trial court (Hearing transcript page 4) . If the grantor had 
reserved exactly one-half of the mineral estate there surely would have 
been no controversy; he would have reserved exactly what he had. 
But instead he reserved three-fourths, despite the fact that he 
only owned one-half. The nearest to the full meaning and intent 
of grantor that can be reached, as derived from the language, is to 
give it the fullest effect possible: reservation of the entire 
one-half mineral interest that he owned. 
-9-
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There is, by analogy, a Utah statute suggesting this same 
result: 
"§57-1-4. ATTEMPTED CONVEYANCE OF MORE THAN GRANTOR OWNS--
EFFECT. -- A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for 
life or years, purporting to convey a greater estate than 
he could lawfully transfer, does not work a forfeiture of 
his estate, but passes to the grantee all the estate which 
the grantor could lawfully transfer." 
This statute states a policy of giving the greatest effect to that 
which is attempted, when that which is attempted cannot be practically 
accomplished. As the statute applies to over-conveyances, it can 
likewise be applied to over-reservations. Any other result would 
deny consistency to the legislative policy behind the statute. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS' ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
It was argued at the hearing on cross motions for summary judg-
ment that this action was barred by the Statute of Limitations 
(Hearing transcript page 9, lines 3-21). Floid Hartman, Appellant 
here and a grantee under the deed, states that he was aware that 
Potter owned less than the full mineral estate at the time the 
deed was delivered to him (Hartman Deposition, p. 24, line 17-
22). He was also present at the preparation and signing of the 
deerl (Hartman Deposition, p. 12, lines 9-10). He was thus on 
notice of any error or "ambiguity" such as he now alleges in the 
deed on June 27, 1951, the day the deed was executed (Hartman 
Deposition p. 5, line ll). Application of any of Utah's statutory 
limitations on actions would bar the cause having accrued on that 
date. 
-10-
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Beyond Appellants' actual notice of the prior conveyance of 
one-half of the mineral estate there is the clear policy of Utah's 
Recording Act, UCA 1953 §57-3-2, that all persons are put on 
notice at the moment a conveyance is recorded, therewith commencing 
the time period limiting any future actions. From the moment a 
person is put on such notice he has the duty to make his inquiries 
and objections, within that statutory period, if he is ever to 
do so. Smith v. Edwards, 81 U. 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932), McConkie v. 
Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1974). If Appellant wished to 
attack the reservation in the Potter deed as inconsistently 
reserving three-fourths of the minerals while Potter only owned 
one-half of the minerals he should have timely done so. He did 
not do so for 25 years and is now surely barred. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants fail to meet the burden of overcoming the presumption 
that the trial court's decision is valid. 
Appellants' first argument that the deed has been treated 
by them as conveying a mineral interest to them -- fails, because 
only they, in all the world, have so treated it. Respondent Potter 
has never, by act or omission, treated the deed as conveying an 
interest to Appellants. More significantly, Respondents Husky and 
Chevron have recognized Potter's mineral interest and paid the 
production royalties to her, and not to Appellants. 
Appellants' second argument that the deed should be mechanis-
tically construed against the grantor and in favor of the grantee --
-11-
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does not apply where other and preferable means of construction can 
be employed. Such other and preferable means are available here and 
should be employed, consistent with this Court's stated policy. 
Appellants' third argument -- that the deed should be construed 
in favor of validity and against ambiguity -- actually favors 
Respondent. There is no ambiguity, but if there is, the rule of 
construction gives greater effect to the language of the instrument 
to reserve one-half, where it purports to reserve three-fourths, 
than it would to reserve less than one-half. 
Finally, Appellants' action was barred by any Utah Statute of 
Limitations that may be applied to it, since the cause against 
defendant Potter accrued in 1951, and Appellants were then aware of 
it. Twenty-five years passed thereafter, before this suit was 
filed. 
In Utah a conveyance is construed in accordance with the intent 
of the parties as expressed in the document. Where the expressed 
intent is at odds with the factual situation, the court should 
adopt a result most nearly approximating the expressed intent 
within the constraints of the factual situation. This rule, applied 
to the instant case, would affirm the trial court by finding that the 
grantor in the 1951 deed actually reserved a one-half interest in 
minerals, rather than the three-fourths interest recited, because 
this result most nearly approximates the intent expressed in the 
document within the constraints of the factual situation. 
For the reasons stated Respondent asks that the well reasoned 
and correct decision of the trial court be affirmed. 
-12-
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Respectfully submitted this ;2 ~ day of November, 1978. 
THOMAS A. NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant - Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing were 
this day deposited postage paid in the United States mails addressed 
to Kenneth M. Hisatake, 1825 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84105. 
Dated this day of November, 1978. 
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